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The Hungarian National Bank set up educational foundations and educational 
programmes which are outside the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Accredita-
tion Committee. They are, however, using as much state funding as the 
whole Hungarian state education system. One of these programmes recently 
appointed German sociologist Gabriele Kuby, one of the main ideologists of 
anti-gender movement in Europe, as a regular visiting professor. The appoint-
ment stirred the academic environment in Hungary sensitive to government 
interventions, as it shows that representatives of anti-gender activism receive 
preferential treatment in some circles. The appointment of Kuby might rein-
force the already-existing anti-gender discourse in Hungary, which is the 
topic of this chapter.
Unlike in some other East-Central European countries, there is currently 
no significant anti-gender movement in Hungary. However, there is a pal-
pable anti-gender discourse, which started to grab scientific attention in the 
past few years, although only to a modest extent (Balogh 2014; Félix 2015; 
Kováts and Põim 2015; Kováts and Soós 2014; Perintfalvi 2015; Pető 2015a, 
2015b). Given the local structural features, the question is why a full-fledged 
movement has not appeared yet? We argue that the major reason for that is 
the lack of a culturally liberal agenda of the current government, as well as 
the (so far) lack of a motive on the government’s behalf to initiate such a 
movement.1 Having said this, we cannot exclude the emergence of such a 
captured movement, organized with the support of collateral organizations 
in the near future (Metz 2015), should the creation of a new enemy served 
the purposes of the government. Indeed, creating an enemy is often used as 
a mobilization strategy by the current government between two elections. 
For instance, in 2015, during the refugee crisis, the communication went far 
beyond policy questions and was directed towards stirring fear and hatred. 
Chapter 7
Anti-gender discourse in Hungary: 
A discourse without a movement?
Eszter Kováts and Andrea Pető
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The same happened during the campaign leading to the government-initiated 
referendum in October 2016 on whether or not the Hungarian Parliament 
should have a say in approving of refugee quotas set by the EU.
However, one must also bear in mind the analytical limits of the framework 
of “a need for creating an enemy”, for such an approach would walk us into 
a trap of interpreting the emergence or non-emergence of a movement solely 
from a local and national point of view. As we argued elsewhere (Kováts 
2017; Pető 2016a, 2016b), these movements are rooted in a broader crisis 
phenomenon and the scale is much larger than specific local or national gov-
ernment or Church interests.
This chapter is organized in three parts. We first discuss the emergence and 
evolution of the anti-gender discourse, which has only sporadically appeared 
in Hungarian public debates. We also examine the actors, who initiated this 
discourse and/or might become the engines of a movement. Second, we 
elaborate on why no movement has emerged yet. Third, we discuss why we 
could however expect such a mobilization in Hungary.
THE HISTORY OF A DISCOURSE
In this section, we discuss the emergence of an anti-gender discourse as 
framed by different actors, and we discuss the relationship between the Euro-
pean level and local actors.
The emergence of a discourse (2008–2009)
In Hungary, “gender ideology” as an expression first appeared in 2008 in 
relation to a textbook for high school students (Pető and Tarajossy 2008), 
which was meant to assist the teaching of history through a gendered lens. An 
MP of FIDESZ identified the presence of “gender ideology” in this textbook, 
claiming that “the greatest danger of this trend is that society will lose its 
sexual identity. Traditional identity will be lost”. She also stated that “[t]his 
is the beginning of the final takeover of the culture of death, of denial, of the 
opposition to our creaturehood”.2
The expression “culture of death” itself, which originates in Pope John 
Paul II’s 1995 Evangelium vitae encyclical letter (Robcis 2015), was popu-
larized in Hungary by the translation of Gabriele Kuby’s book Die Gender 
Revolution – Relativismus in Aktion (2008). The book is indeed freely down-
loadable from the website of the Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP, 
Christian Democratic People Party). The blurb for the Hungarian edition of 
the book was written by the Hungarian bishop László Bíró and the Austrian 
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bishop Andreas Laun, whose book “Christian Man in a Modern World” on 
the same topic was published in Hungarian in 2014.
The Lexicon on Ambiguous and Debatable Terms Regarding Family 
Life and Ethical Questions, which became a key theoretical foundation of 
anti-gender mobilization in several countries, was only translated in 2012 
(in Hungarian Lexicon of the Family, Családlexikon 2012). Nonetheless, 
its most important articles on gender had already been published earlier in 
a journal for caring professionals. Furthermore, one of the arguments put 
forward in the Lexicon – that differences measured by statistics between men 
and women in any given profession can be the result of some natural differ-
ences between men and women and not discrimination – appeared also in 
one of the earliest articles on “gender ideology” by theology teacher Tomka. 
In a piece published in 2010, Tomka argues that while “[t]he equal rights of 
women is a principle that we all agree on”, it is only the first step that eventu-
ally leads to a slippery slope. Through a “Trojan horse” argument, he claims 
that, while the first appearance of women’s equality is in a beautiful cloak, 
it later leads to the mingling of sexes. In other words, any action aiming at 
gender equality can be interpreted as the first step to a slippery slope.
Framing anti-gender discourse
Although the texts quoted above paved the way for the anti-gender discourse, 
“gender ideology” explicitly appeared on the political agenda for the first 
time in 2010 in response to an amendment of the curricula for preschool edu-
cation by the socialist government. It then got wide publicity in right-wing 
media. According to this amendment, preschool teachers should “deliberately 
avoid any strengthening of gender stereotypes and facilitate the dismantling 
of the prejudices concerning the social equality of genders”.3 Kornél Papp, 
the head of the Synod’s Education Office of the Reformed Church in Hun-
gary, denounced this as “wholly frightening”, arguing:
What does it entail in practice to avoid gender stereotypes? For instance, does 
it mean that in fairy tales the parents will no longer be called Dad and Mom, 
but rather Parent One and Parent Two? Or that one has to intervene if a little 
girl plays too much with her dolls. One should rather convince her to play with 
an excavator? Girly outfits are also gender stereotypes: the skirt, the long hair, 
the ribbon and the patent leather shoes. If we take the amendment seriously, we 
should ask the parents to have the little girls wear pants from now on.4
It is no surprise that the right-wing conservative FIDESZ-KDNP government, 
which stepped into office in June 2010, removed the contested sentence from 
the curricula. Rózsa Hoffmann, Undersecretary of Education, explained that 
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the sentence had to be deleted as it “introduced the foundations of the so-
called gender ideology into preschool education, which in the name of equal-
ity dismisses the differentiation of sexes as senseless”.5
After this event, the issue of “gender ideology” disappeared both from 
political debates and mainstream media and only marginal voices such as the 
anti-feminist blog Férfihang (Men’s Voice) and the Far-Right portal kuruc.
info, continued to keep the issue on the agenda.
While in several European countries anti-gender mobilizations started in 
2012 or 2013, Hungary remained relatively quiet. Nevertheless, the trans-
lation of the Slovakian Episcopacy’s Pastoral Letter to Advent (1 Decem-
ber 2013), which warned against gender equality as being a Trojan horse 
aiming at erasing the differences between sexes, was read out loud in Hun-
garian churches.6
In the media, the largest right-wing weekly Heti Válasz also emphasized 
in its article “A tolerancia diktatúrája” (The Dictatorship of Tolerance) that 
the gay lobby was about to restrict the rights of the majority. This text, which 
was published soon after the Budapest Pride Parade of 2013, further claimed:
This year homosexual activists have shifted into a higher gear worldwide. While 
beforehand their stated goal was the elimination of discrimination, today it is the 
rights of the majority that are being endangered. Those committed to a family 
model based on the relationship between a man and a woman are on the losing 
side all the way from Sweden to the United States.7
The reception of EU developments
From 2014 onwards, anti-gender discourse became denser. This was triggered 
by two reports discussed at the European Parliament: the – unsuccessful – 
Estrela report on sexual and reproductive health and rights, and the Lunacek 
report against homophobia and other forms of discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity, which was adopted by the European Parlia-
ment in February 2014.8 At the time, the right-wing press published numerous 
articles denouncing “gender ideology”. According to the Heti Válasz, which 
applied again the trope of majority-turning-minority:
Europe once again is loud with questions of bioethics. Gay rights organizations 
want to extend the privileges of homosexuals, the gender ideologists shifted into 
a higher gear, and in Belgium active euthanasia for children has become legal. 
But why did two FIDESZ European Parliament MPs vote for the LGBT-lobby’s 
proposal? . . . Twelve-year old girls could have abortions without parental consent, 
popularization of homosexuality would become obligatory in preschools, and 
member countries would be obliged to legalize gay marriage. This is the gist of the 
two reports against which hundreds of thousands of Europeans petitioned recently.9
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Such right-wing media reports sparked an increasing interest among con-
servative politicians, who started to use the phrase “gender ideology”. For 
example Zsolt Semjén, deputy prime minister and the president of KDNP, 
said in an interview for Hír TV that “gender ideology gets a brutal amount 
of support from Brussels. Small but loud interest groups in my opinion want 
to impose on the world a deviant worldview”.10 The same frame was used by 
Katalin Novák, Undersecretary of Family Affairs. She claimed in a deplor-
ing tone, discussing between the lines the term “gender”, that some Western 
governments are trying to sneak into EU and the UN documents expressions, 
which are expanding the notion of the family. She also stressed out that the 
Hungarian government does not agree with having hardly definable terms 
and controversial principles in these documents and would initiate a coalition 
with those countries which share Hungarian standpoint.11
Anti-gender discourse was further strengthened by the activity of the con-
servative news portal Mandiner, which, for example, published an interview 
with Gabriele Kuby, in which she warns Hungarians that “gender ideology” 
is an international conspiracy that could soon reach Hungary. A translation 
of bishop Laun’s Der Christ in der modernen Welt (“Christian Man in a 
Modern World”) was also translated into Hungarian at the time. In this book, 
Laun compares “gender ideology” with Marxism and socialism and sees it 
as an attack on the Church. According to him, criticisms against the Catholic 
Church would show that religious identity is under attack, as it was under 
state socialism (Balogh 2014, 11–12).
Dissident voices
Alternative voices emerged in early 2015. In February, the Hungarian transla-
tion of a study by an Austrian Catholic moral theologian Gerhard Marschütz, 
who criticizes the Catholic Church for its role in mobilizing against “gender 
ideology”, was published in the 2014 Keresztény-Zsidó Teológiai Évkönyv 
(Christian-Jewish Theological Yearbook 2014). In this piece, Marschütz 
criticizes the Catholic Church’s wholesale adaptation of Gabriele Kuby’s 
thoughts, as well as her role in drafting the above-mentioned Slovakian Pas-
toral Letter. He proceeds with an analysis of Kuby’s argumentation, refutes 
her claims from a moral theological point of view and discusses the reasons 
why the Catholic Church should learn from the discipline of gender stud-
ies (Marschütz 2014). This is a radical approach in the Hungarian Catholic 
context which shows that Hungarian Catholic context is multilayered, which 
offers chance to think about future alliance between progressive actors.
Piarist monk József Urbán also hits an unusual tone in his response to a 
statement by deputy prime minister, Zsolt Semjén, in which the latter, when 
commenting on the Slovak referendum against marriage equality, said that 
122 Chapter 7
“the Slovak nation bore witness to our common Christian values and normal-
ity”.12 József Urbán13 questioned Semjén’s gesture and wondered whether 
Christianity unconditionally leads to voting “yes” on the referendum. He also 
raised doubts about whether this referendum was necessary. This blog entry 
was followed by an intense debate, first under the entry itself and later in the 
press. As a response to a question on his blog, Urbán refined his argument, 
arguing: “Gay marriage is not my fundamental concern. My concern is how 
we could, as Christians, avoid contributing to spreading hatred, violence, 
shaming and fear. How could a topic like that of marriage, which . . . became 
a question of the referendum, exert violence? That’s my concern. The way 
I see it, this is truly the question” (Urbán 2015).
This comment led a journalist of the conservative weekly Heti Válasz to 
interview Urbán about the alleged contradiction between the Catholic teach-
ing and his opinion. Urbán’s response was about overcoming fear and listen-
ing to each other: “What would greatly help – and perhaps it is downright 
indispensable for the conversation – if we stopped using the words of the 
magisterium as shields, and if we stopped saying – or suggesting – that the 
other is “not normal”, or “not a Christian”.14
A third element should be mentioned: the shifts in Katalin Novák’s – 
and more broadly the governmental – communication. In 2011, during the 
Hungarian EU-presidency, the government’s standpoint was that family 
mainstreaming should be supported instead of gender mainstreaming, which 
they perceived as an anti-family agenda (Juhász 2012). In early March 2015, 
however, at the UN Commission on the Status of Women’s 59th Congress in 
New York City, the Undersecretary of State announced that “family policy 
cannot be pitched against women’s equality. It can be effectively pursued in 
parallel with women’s politics” and advocated women’s increased political 
representation.15 Novák did apparently not consider the issue of gender equal-
ity to be against family, nor to be a Trojan horse via which fierce ideas make 
their way into international organizations. However, the fact that Novák held 
a speech at a conference of the One of Us Association in Paris in March 2016, 
and her receiving an award by the World Congress of Families in Georgia 
in May 2016 indicate that she is somehow involved in the transnational net-
works mobilizing against “gender ideology”.
The activities of the local office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) 
should be mentioned as well. Indeed, the FES – to which belongs one author 
of this chapter – organized the first dialogue forums explicitly focusing on 
the anti-gender mobilizations in Europe in February and June 2014. It was 
about initiating a dialogue between conservative and progressive opinion 
makers in Hungary in order to prevent similar fundamentalist movements 
locally. Given the great interest, the series proceeded from the fall of 2014 on, 
touching upon social issues that representatives of different world views and 
disciplinary backgrounds could connect to, like motherhood, masculinities, 
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childbearing, love and dignity.16 The aim of the dialogue series is to build 
trust among actors, to create a space of (self)reflection and to search for a 
common vocabulary, without which the various actors cannot communicate 
with respect. Such self-reflection is deemed to hinder the construction of 
conspiracy theories and the demonization of opponents, allowing all actors 
to move forward on gender issues (Kováts 2015b, 10). The experience of the 
forums seem to be so far that there are progressive and conservative opinion 
makers committed to overcome the trenches and the mistrust. Whether it 
could contribute to prevent an anti-gender movement or even bring about 
progressive changes is yet to be seen.
Turning the tide: The “female principium” discussion
Change in the anti-gender discourse happened with an intervention of an 
influential FIDESZ politician, who made the concept of “gender” a topic of 
discussion not only in media but also in everyday life. On 13 December 2015 
László Kövér, president of the Parliament, declared at the annual congress 
of the FIDESZ that the highest form of self-fulfilment of women is to give 
birth, complaining about the spread of “gender madness” in Europe. This was 
followed by a statement by the heavily state sponsored conservative pop icon 
Ákos Kovács, who claimed that the task of women is to “fulfill the female 
principium”, which is giving birth and belonging to someone.
These two statements are embedded in the general fear of demographic 
decline of the Hungarian government. In the upcoming weeks, 10 to 15 pro 
and contra articles and numerous blog posts were published daily about the 
“duty or role of women”. This discussion, involving critical voices from 
progressive men and conservative thinkers, however, only sporadically 
touched upon issues relevant to the anti-gender debates and remained in the 
framework of a feminist debate. It is also important to emphasize that this 
“female principium” discussion was a national centred debate without visible 
connections to other anti-feminist or anti-gender movements in Europe. In 
winter 2015/2016, the government started to finance a street poster and adver-
tisement campaign on the theme of family, the first topics being siblings and 
fatherhood. When finalizing this chapter (October 2016), there was no sign 
this campaign would be continued, but this discussion can be renewed at any 
moment in the context of the demographic discourse.
WHY IS THERE NO MOVEMENT? DISCOURAGING FACTORS
A comparison with the emergence of anti-gender movements across Europe 
points towards several discouraging factors, which might explain why there 
is (still) no visible anti-gender movement in Hungary. They relate to the (lack 
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of) institutionalization of gender equality policies – there is nothing one can 
protest against – and the state of affairs with the current government, which 
nearly eliminated all NGOs that could be advocates for gender equality. The 
Orbán government is opposing any liberal agenda and it rejects any kind of 
gender equality mechanism at governmental level. For that reason, only a few 
weak and non-influential NGOs can be labelled representatives of “gender 
ideology”.
First, as opposed to France, Slovakia or Poland for instance, there is no 
gender mainstreaming policy in Hungary.17 The institutionalization of gender 
equality is relatively weak today and cannot serve as a possible catalyst for 
the movement. The same is true for the LGBT issues. Unlike in Slovakia, 
Slovenia or France, where recent LGBT-related legislation helped activating 
anti-gender mobilization, such pro-LGBT legislation is currently not imagin-
able in Hungary. Hungary had already adopted a relatively progressive law 
on registered partnership in 2009, and no future improvement of LGBT rights 
can be envisaged at short sight. Finally, unlike countries where anti-gender 
mobilizations could piggyback on general public discontent with the gov-
ernment, it does not seem to be case in Hungary (Kováts and Soós 2014, 
119–120).
Second, the status of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary does not 
facilitate the establishment of a movement. According to the 2011 census, 
39% of the population declares to be Catholic, 11% belongs to the Protestant 
Reformed Church and 2.2% to the Lutheran Church (18% does not belong 
to any religion; 27% didn’t answer). Balogh (2014) showed that in Hungary 
the number of practitioners of Catholicism is significantly smaller than in 
those countries where the anti-gender mobilization was powerful. Whereas 
the Roman Catholic Church plays a significant role in the mobilizations all 
over Europe, in Hungary the Church does not possess such a leading opinion 
making character. This leads to wonder whether the Church is capable of 
initiating and mobilizing large networks of active citizens and whether such 
a potential can be found in civil society outside the Church circles. For now it 
seems that in both Church and civil circles there is no “political culture within 
which mobilization and street politics would be accepted and considered 
valuable” (Kováts and Soós 2014, 120). However, the CitizenGO initiative, 
which has an active Hungarian branch, may prove this wrong. The initiative 
seems to be quite successful in mobilizing networks of people along conser-
vative values by collecting their signatures.
Third, several structural particularities of Hungarian conservatism must 
be emphasized. While there is often a continuity in conservative tradition 
in Western Europe, there was a fundamental break in 1945 in Hungary, as 
in other post-communist countries. This resulted in an alternative trajec-
tory in the development of conservative subculture (Pető 2003). From 1990, 
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Hungarian conservatism had to rebuild itself and hinged on key questions: 
What tradition(s) would it rely on? What would it borrow from the political 
toolkit of pre-1945 conservatism? This led to the selection of specific fea-
tures (“chosen tradition”). For this reason, there are no traceable differences 
between the gender discourses of the Hungarian right-wing conservatives and 
that of the Far Right. Both follow the traditional normative family model. 
They aim at the same discursive space of “family”, which in turn makes 
conservative discourse more susceptible to fundamentalism (Pető 2003). It 
will be a question for the future if right-wing conservatives can protect their 
version of normative family discourse from the Far Right.
Finally, the absence of an organized anti-gender movement in Hungary 
could be partly attributed to the success of conflict-avoiding initiatives. As 
shown with the experience of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, many representa-
tives of conservative and human rights organizations are open to dialogue, 
certainly when the issue is not yet polarized. As presented, dissident voices 
have also emerged among Christian communities. This includes the rise 
of the Magyarországi Teológusnők Ökumenikus Egyesülete (Hungarian 
Women Theologians’ Ecumenical Association), the Lutheran blog Kötőszó 
and the recent publication of a volume with studies on theology and gender 
from various Christian confessions, published by the publishing house of the 
Lutheran Church (Hausmann et al. 2016).
WHY WE COULD EXPECT THE EMERGENCE  
OF A MOVEMENT
In countries like France (Chetcuti 2014; Robcis 2015) and Poland (Grze-
balska 2015) smaller mobilizations preceded a particular catalysing issue, 
which then prompted the development of a structured anti-gender movement. 
These mobilizations were not necessarily part of a deliberate strategy escalat-
ing from isolated, sporadic cases of resistance towards a greater opposition, 
but made the general public more conscious of certain concepts and of their 
alleged dangers, serving as the scaffolding of a larger movement. Hungary 
has experienced, as detailed earlier, small events in the past years, such as 
the 2010 debate about avoiding gender stereotypes in preschool teaching and 
the 2014 debate about the reports by Estrela and Lunacek. Therefore, the 
theoretical background work and arguments necessary to the emergence of a 
movement are already present in the country.
Indeed, one of the precondition for the emergence of a movement is the 
recognition of the dangers of gender. As we have highlighted, this discourse 
is actively promoted by right-wing media and civil society actors in Hungary. 
Moreover, some political actors, journalists, representatives of churches and 
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conservative civil organizations are ready to advocate this cause publicly. 
One can mention, among others, the already mentioned Hungarian branch 
of the transnational network of CitizenGO initiative, which mobilizes for 
the European Citizen initiative MumDad&Kids; the party foundation of the 
minor coalition partner Christian Democrats KDNP (Barankovics Founda-
tion), the Magyarországi Aquinói Szent Tamás Társaság (Hungarian Thomas 
Aquinas Association), the community university who invited Kuby to Hun-
gary (Wekerle Business School), the Association of Conservative Students at 
ELTE University Budapest which organized in March 2016 a debate about 
“gender ideology” and protested against a lesbian flash mob in May; the 
Századvég Foundation, a think tank heavily sponsored by the government, 
which has recently published a book against same-sex marriage and orga-
nized a conference on the “human rights fundamentalism”.
Several media outlets have also published on the issue: newspapers 
(Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Idők), a weekly magazine (Heti Válasz), television 
channels (HírTV, EchoTV), a radio station (Kossuth Rádió), popular Internet 
portals and blogs (mandiner, 888.hu), Christian fundamentalist evangelical 
forums (Hetek) and far-right-wing related portals (kuruc.info).
Furthermore, although there is no significant conservative civil sphere 
beyond these media outlets, the government has its own civil organizations, 
which can be easily mobilized if the government has to be defended from 
what they perceive as an unjustified external attack (Pető and Vasali 2014). 
Therefore, the Hungarian government with its anti-EU discourse could osten-
sibly support and encourage the development of an anti-gender movement, 
as well as the construction of a captivating vision of the enemy. In 2015, 
Orbán’s government started a new communication campaign in order to 
strengthen the “family-friendly thinking”, to promote pro-family world views 
and to provide “information about the positive results of family politics”.18 As 
the refugee crisis deepened, the campaign was postponed, but based on the 
experience of the anti-refugee campaign over the spring and summer 2015 as 
well as prior to the government-initiated referendum about refugee quotas in 
October 2016, we assume that this “family-friendly” campaign could become 
another territory to mobilize afresh the vision of the enemy. If the govern-
ment for any reason needs a (new) image of an enemy, it is poised to harness 
public support behind it, through which it can relay the message to otherwise 
uninvolved social groups as well.
Finally, progressive actors and voices in Hungary are weak. This could 
imply lesser triggers for the emergence of a conservative movement, but it 
also means that a possible anti-gender mobilization would face a frail opposi-
tion. Indeed, the anti-gender movement is partly built on the weaknesses of 
progressive politics (Pető 2016b; Wimbauer, Motakef and Teschlade 2015). 
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In such a political constellation, the “gender ideology” discourse offers a 
fertile ground for an organized movement, potentially feeding into many 
fears and insecurities. In Hungary, human rights–focused civil networks 
dealing with women’s and LGBT issues have weak social grounding. They 
have not performed the “radical re-thinking of the toolkit of the critique of 
the regime” (Pető 2014) and their agenda remained reactive. This proves to 
be especially challenging in the defensive stance into which stigmatizing 
government politics have pushed them, which in turn justifies their positions 
and increases their urgent demands for the EU and the UN norms (Pető 2014; 
Pető and Vasali 2014). Wimbauer and her colleagues (2015) also argue that 
discourses against gender equality are an explicit or implicit attempt to get 
experiences of precarity and precarization under control and that the feminist 
and LGBT struggles have found a comfortable place in the neoliberal order 
and are therefore made co-responsible by the anti-gender actors for the dam-
age it causes.
CONCLUSION
In the context of (Central and Eastern) European countries Hungary remains 
a unique case with a rather long history of anti-gender discourse, but with-
out any palpable anti-gender movement. This, however, can easily change, 
should the Orbán’s government or the NGOs near the government build up 
the new enemy “gender”. So far progressive actors have offered neither visi-
ble nor popular alternatives to the Orbán government (which uses partly Left-
ist and anti-systemic arguments to neoliberalism), and this opens the scene 
also to anti-EU discourses and to the more forceful Far Right party Jobbik 
and other anti-modernist alternatives (Pető and Vasali 2014). At the moment, 
the anti-gender rhetoric is one of the possible rhetorical frames besides the 
anti-migrant narrative to be used for political purposes of polarization. As 
the refugee crisis intensifies anti-gender rhetoric might be integrated in this 
frame and then has a potential of mass mobilization. On the opposite side, as 
we have argued elsewhere (Kováts 2015a, 2017; Kováts and Põim 2015; Pető 
2015a, 2015b, 2016a), it is indispensable for scholars seeking to understand 
anti-gender movements and for activists and politicians on the progressive 
side seeking to counteract them, to reflect on the content of progressive poli-
tics (questioning neoliberalism, and the rooting of the identity politics in neo-
liberalism), on the language of equality (statistical equality, human rights, EU 
as a neoliberal project while being sold as norm owner of gender equality and 
human rights) and on the language of politics (technocratic, policy-based). 
This is all the more necessary because what remains of the post–World War II 
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consensus is becoming more and more challenged by the growing fundamen-
talism represented by the Far Right and now by anti-gender movements.
At the end of September 2016, Hungarian tax authorities closed down the 
quasi university where Gabriele Kuby was appointed as a visiting profes-
sor. This shows that maybe the anti-gender movement will not be supported 
wholeheartedly by the Hungarian state. This restrain may open up space for 
those political forces who are fighting against hate and discrimination to look 
and to maybe find allies in unexpected places.
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